Inventing and patenting activities of scientists: in the expectation of money or reputation? by Devrim Göktepe-Hulten & Prashanth Mahagaonkar
Inventing and patenting activities of scientists:
in the expectation of money or reputation?
Devrim Go¨ktepe-Hulten Æ Prashanth Mahagaonkar
Published online: 10 June 2009
 The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract We propose that scientists use patents/invention disclosures as signals to gain
reputation than financial benefits. Based on a newly created dataset on the commercial
activities among 2,500 scientists affiliated with 67 institutes of the German Max Planck
Society, we explore the relation between the expectations of scientists concerning the
outcomes of commercial activities and the likelihood of their patenting and disclosure
behaviors. We find that expectation of gaining financial benefits are not related with the
patenting activities of scientists without industrial cooperation. Instead, their expectation to
gain/increase reputation through commercial activities is correlated with their patenting
and disclosures activities. This may in turn also increase the possibility to gain academic
promotion, financial benefits through industrial collaboration etc., rather than the imme-
diate personal financial gains.
Keywords Academic commercialization  Patents  Rewards  Reputation 
Signaling
JEL Classification B31  O31  O34
1 Introduction
Scientists carry out the tasks of education, research and commercial activities (the third task)
at universities. Despite their importance, the roles, motivations and perceptions of university
inventors have been relatively neglected topics of study. As Link and Siegel (2007) have
argued, since the initiation of the Bayh–Dole Act, scholars who assess university technology
transfer have examined institutions that have emerged to facilitate entrepreneurial
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commercialization, such as university technology transfer offices (TTOs), industry-univer-
sity cooperative research centers, research/science parks, and incubators and different patent
legislations. Most studies on university-industry relations have focused on a few selected elite
universities in the United States, in specific science-based sectors. In these studies, the focus
of interest is primarily the importance of institutions (patent legislation, policy mechanisms)
and organizations (TTOs, university administration) in the patenting and other entrepre-
neurial activities of scientists (see recent reviews by Siegel and Phan 2005; Phan and Siegel
2006; Siegel et al. 2007; Rothermael et al. 2007). Some studies initiated the importance of
individuals, but rather limited themselves only to entrepreneurial traits, experience, scientific
background and demographic factors such as age in order to analyze commercialization
motives of scientists. In particular there have been a few studies that paid attention to the roles
of individual inventors in the university-industry technology transfer and explore why aca-
demic scientists patent (Gulbrandsen 2005; Meyer 2005; Azoulay et al. 2007; Allen et al.
2007; Baldini et al. 2007; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008; Goktepe 2008).
The primary missions of scientists employed at universities and PROs (public research
organizations) have been the creation and dissemination of knowledge and education of
students. After the 1990s, scientists are also expected to carry out a third mission, namely
commercial activities like patenting and company formation. Patenting is a mechanism to
‘privatize’ information by excluding others to the intellectual property to gain monopoly
rights over the commercial use of the inventions, and it is essentially an economic phe-
nomenon. According to Thursby and Thursby (2007), the common rationale behind uni-
versity patenting and licensing is that they provide financial incentives for universities,
faculty, and firms to engage in the commercialization of university research findings.1 It is
almost believed that any invention would barely come out of a human’s brain if that human
did not have the possibility to earn all or part of the stream of economic rents that results from
the industrial exploitation of his or her invention, a preliminary condition for that being that he
or she ought to own a propriety right (usually a patent) over that invention (Schmookler 1966).
Although commercial activities are seen as potential revenue sources for universities, it
is not clear if scientists will also pursue commercial activities as potential revenue sources
or it is bolted on to their traditional roles and expectations of being engaged in science.
Expected monetary benefits due to patenting and licensing activities are more relevant for
firms and TTOs. However benefits that patents provide to firms might not be the same as
for the individual scientists. Academic scientists may have different concerns and
expectations when they are involved in patenting activities compared to firms and uni-
versity-TTOs. For instance, based on their research on the patenting and licensing activities
in the US, Thursby and Thursby (2007, p. 633) found licensing income is the most
important objective for the TTO and the central administration, and firms. For faculty
funds for sponsored research are the most important objective. Thursby and Thursby (2007,
p. 625) suggested ‘‘patents are not necessary to provide incentives for university scientists
and engineers to invent and disclose; the norms of science and the reward structure for
science provide incentives for invention and public disclosure. Likewise, Rosenberg (1974)
had already argued that inventive activity—along with technological change and the
production of scientific and technical knowledge—as something that was independent of
economic needs and motivations.
Accordingly a deeper understanding of scientists’ expectations will provide better
policy insights on the initiation of entrepreneurial activities at the universities and PROs.
We therefore specifically focus on the relationship between the likelihood of scientists’
1 This has been a common argument for the initiation of the Bayh-Dole Act as well.
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patenting and inventing activities and the rewards they are expecting from commercial
activities which are measured in terms of financial benefits and scientific reputation. In line
with these arguments, it is of particular interest to understand what matters for scientists to
disclose their inventions to authorities and patent. Is it correlated to the expectations for
gaining reputation or financial rewards?
In order to address this question we use a unique database developed on the commer-
cialization activities of over 2,500 scientists at 67 different institutes of Max Planck
Society for Advancement of Sciences (hereafter referred as MPG). Using discrete choice
models on patenting and invention disclosure to the MPG, we analyzed if expectation of
financial benefits and reputation influence the inventing and patenting activities of scien-
tists. We distinguish between industry-collaborating and non-collaborating scientists to
focus on specific motivations of non-collaborators’ innovation activities. We control for
different socio-demographic as well as institutional factors and scientific fields in our
analysis. We find that for non-collaborating academic inventors, invention disclosure and
patenting activities are not automatically related to their financial expectations from the
commercial activities. Instead, the expectation of reputation that drives patenting and
invention disclosure activities of scientists. This confirms the assertions made by Long
(2002) that patenting is basically an information transfer mechanism and patentees use
patents not always for the expected financial benefits by excluding others but for the non-
monetary benefits that accrue due to the information conveyed. Individuals may resort to
actions that signal their knowledge, skills and resources by conveying the right information
to the relevant group.
It can be interpreted that scientists who are working under the conditions of generous
research funds, like MPG, but with a strong desire as well as stipulation of doing cutting-
edge research will still be motivated by traditional academic values, like increasing rec-
ognition and reputation by showing the novelty of their research. Yet, we can not conclude
scientists who are facing more scarce/limited resources for research maybe forced to
engage in commercial activities or patenting in order to gain more money. Patenting
activities could, to a certain extent, be independent from private economic incentives.
Therefore rather than a total transition to an entrepreneurial identity or mission, scientists
are still keeping their traditional expectations from science as focus. There may be other
reasons that academic scientists are not willing or in need to abandon the norms of science
even when they are involved in commercialization activities.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows, the following section deals with the
question of why scientists patent and disclose their inventions and takes the view of patents
as reputation signals that scientists use. In the third section, perceptions and motivations of
scientists are shed light upon and propositions are put forward after which in the fourth
section the new dataset is introduced along with the variables of interest and methodology.
The fifth section puts forward the estimation results and analysis and sixth concludes.
2 Theoretical background
In order to develop the principal arguments of this paper, we revisit some studies on norms
and rewards in science2 and the basic arguments behind patents. From a legal perspective,
2 The concept of rewards (benefits) from science should not be misinterpreted as the sole reason of scientists
is to obtain social status and financial gains. There is considerable evidence that scientists have a desire for
inventing. Scientists at universities are intrinsically motivated to do research. Much of the incentive to
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a patent confers legal rights concerning the exploitation of an invention which allows the
owner the best opportunity to profit from the invention by preventing others from copying
it. With a patent, an inventor has the right to exclude others from commercial use of the
intellectual property rights conferred by the patent. This allows the inventor to appropriate
economic returns from her inventive activity (Arrow 1962). The prospect of gaining profits
from this special form of protection serves to promote research activity and to give an
incentive for new investment. An inventor does not need a patent in order to exploit an
invention; but without a patent the inventor would not be able to prevent others from
copying the invention. Inventors are often not in a position to produce or market their
invention from their own resources. Patents, being a form of commercial property, provide
a basis for owners to negotiate with potential investors or other business partners while
preserving their intellectual property rights.
Academic inventors are also supposed to disclose the details of the invention/innova-
tion. While making the research results publicly available allows others to build on the
invention, as such it also compels others to recognize and respect to the scientific results
shown in the invention. Although there have been concerns that increase in university
patenting has challenged the open nature of university research and shifted academic
research towards more commercialization, a number of scholars have investigated the
relationship between patenting and open dissemination of research results by scientists in
the forms of publications (Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Jensen and Murray 2005; Van
Looy et al. 2006). These studies have also found that publication and patenting are
complementary and not competing activities of university researchers. Most of these
studies have found a positive relationship between scientific publication and patenting
activities. Jensen and Murray (2005) stated that most university research generates dual
outcomes which can be utilized as paper-patent pairs. Scientific publications will follow as
in most cases a research project can generate outputs that simultaneously contribute to
public knowledge and to commercialization. Academic inventor manages to show his
research value both as a scientific discovery and a potential commercial product.
University research is typically conducted in the context of the norms of science
(Merton 1973). As such, there exists a ‘natural’ incentive within universities both to invent
and to disclose rather than there being a tension between the two incentives (Eisenberg
1987).3 Scientific knowledge principles should be ‘assigned to the community’ rather than
the scientist, and the scientist’s claim to intellectual property from their work should be
limited to ‘recognition and esteem’. As implied by communalism, the reward for discovery
and research should be recognition. Stephan (1996) argues that the priority reward system
confers a form of property right that differs from the patent system in providing for
incentives to invent and disclose. The priority reward is exclusionary in that the first to
discover a principle receives the recognition and then captures the reputation for the
discovery, and, as such, it requires no separate disclosure requirement. This winner-takes-
all property provides an incentive to invent and, at the same time, it promotes the incentive
to disclose. A scientist will disclose a discovery as soon as there is sufficient evidence of
Footnote 2 continued
invent comes from the joy of solving research questions (Levin and Stephan 1991; Stephan 1996). But their
behavior is inevitably influenced by social rewards. In particular, the possibility that someone else gets
credit and due to himself is as unacceptable to a scientist as to anyone else (Ben-David and Sullivan 1975).
3 In the context of industrial research and development, there is a natural tension between the incentives for
patenting and invention disclosure. If firm could not exclude others from commercial use; it would have an
incentive to keep secret the inventions.
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validity in order to gain recognition and reputation in a timely fashion among their peers.
As firms and TTOs are expecting monetary benefits on account of patenting and licensing
activities it is also interesting to investigate if financial rewards are relevant for the
invention disclosure and patenting activities of individual academic scientists.
In the light of the brief overview as a point of departure we tip our hand with two basic
assumptions: (1) scientists have an interest in recognition and prestige; (2) scientists have
an interest in achieving economic gains4 (Stephan and Levin 1992).
2.1 Norms and rewards of science
2.1.1 Recognition and prestige:
Merton (1957) stated that the institution of science has developed ‘‘a reward system
designed to give recognition and esteem to those who has best fulfilled their roles, to those
who have made genuinely original contributions to the common stock of knowledge’’. The
reward system operates to encourage creative scientists to be highly productive and to
produce a higher correlation between the quantity and quality of their output (Cole and
Cole 1967). Therefore scientists are motivated by rewards of recognition and prestige
among peers, and they have a strong interest in winning the game. By the nature of their
work scientists constantly ask research questions and aim to show their research results
among their peers to achieve reputation and recognition (Merton 1957).
Merton (1957) also noted the apparent contradiction between the norms of communality
which require scientists to publish their research results and consider them as the property
of mankind, and their sensitivity and desire for superiority in discoveries. He argued the
proper recognition of discovery is a necessary condition for the maintenance of commu-
nality, since without recognition scientists could not defend their intellectual property.
These statements created a theoretically meaningful basis for further empirical research of
the correlation between rewards and the patenting activities of scientists.
Patenting can enhance the prestige and increase the scientific productivity of the sci-
entists by reaffirming the novelty and usefulness of their research (Owen-Smith and Powell
2001, 2003). More recent empirical findings also show patenting as a matter of doing
something professionally satisfying and rewarding (Gulbrandsen 2005; Baldini et al. 2007;
Goktepe 2008). As we discuss below, due to ongoing changes in the role of scientific
institutes and scientists, some scientists may use patents to signal the quality and novelty of
their research. Although there is no explicit evidence that patents are used as a criterion to
evaluate the academic merits of the scientists (e.g. in academic promotion), some scientists
may consider patenting in order to increase their visibility and reputation.
On the other hand, the extent to which scientists and their research milieus are ready for
rewarding commercial activities as an academic merit will influence the decision of sci-
entists to patent or not. Scientists who are concerned or surrounded by cohorts with more
traditional academic values like open (public) nature of science might be less motivated to
patent. Similarly, in order not to risk their career development scientists, e.g. junior sci-
entists, who are more anxious or unsure about how peers, leaders and potential future
employees will assess/react to their commercial/patenting activities, will be less likely to
patent.
4 Financial rewards are measured in two ways; (1) gains from commercial activities and (2) getting access
to external funds, industrial research grants.
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2.1.2 Source of personal income
Etzkowitz (1998) and Slaughter and Leslie (1997) underlined financial rewards, monetary
compensation and profit motive in their analyses of the new entrepreneurial scientist.
Universities that provide greater rewards for scientists’ involvement in patenting (e.g. in
the forms of equity shares, royalty distribution) are found to motivate scientists to com-
mercialize (patent) more. Greater rewards are measured by the amount of royalty income
received by the inventor. Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) argued that scientists’ decisions
to disclose are shaped by their perceptions of the benefits of patenting, licensing and start-
up company formation. The incentives to be involved in technology transfer are magnified
or minimized by the perceived costs and gains of interacting with industry and TTOs.
Siegel et al. (2003) concluded that organizational factors, in particular scientists’ reward
systems and technology transfer office compensation, influence the productivity of the
technology transfer activities and thus the motivations of scientists to disclose their
inventions.
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) assumed that faculty members would be responsive to
financial incentives and that there would be a direct relationship between licensing royalty
distribution rates and the amount of technology transfer across universities. Thursby et al.
(2001) and Lach and Schankerman (2003) provided empirical evidence that milestone
payments and share of license revenues from their inventions are positively related to the
motivations of inventors to patent. Markman et al. (2004) investigated the relationship
between entrepreneurial activities and payments to scientists, departments and TTO staff.
They argued that scientists and their departments will be unlikely to disclose or participate
in technology transfer activities unless they are given proper incentives to do so. They
expect licensing revenues from technology transfer activities can motivate scientists and
their departments towards entrepreneurial activities given the scarcity of resources on
research.
However, there are counter arguments why financial rewards may not influence com-
mercialization activities. In addition to Mertonian norms5 (see Merton 1973); there is
considerable evidence that scientists have a desire for doing research and inventing. The
puzzle-solving nature of research is described by the historian of science, Robert Hull
(1988 in Stephan and Levin 2005). Puzzle-solving involves a fascination for the research
process itself (Stephan and Levin 2005). Scientists at universities are intrinsically moti-
vated to do research. Much of the incentive to invent comes from the joy of solving
research questions (Levin and Stephan 1991; Stephan 1996). Thus they are intrinsically
motivated to conduct research, quite apart from the ability to earn financial rents from their
effort (Hellmann 2007).
‘‘A scientist, by choice of vocation, would heretofore have been assumed to have put
aside all thoughts of business-like activity to live a monk-like existence as a searcher for
truths about nature’’ (Etzkowitz 1998). Etzkowitz continues—‘‘attired in a white lab coat to
protect their street clothing from chemical spills, the uniform of the scientist also signified
a certain purity of motives, an abstraction from material concerns and a bemused tendency
toward absentmindedness in daily life’’. Further, ‘‘they were believed to find rewards for
their discoveries not in pecuniary advantage but in recognition from their scientific peers
through citation in the literature, election to a national academy and the ultimate accolade
of the Nobel Prize’’.
5 Merton suggested four norms of science: universalism, communism (or communalism), disinterestedness,
and organized skepticism.
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In a recent study Jeon and Menicucci (2008) discussed the allocation of talent (brain
drain) between the science and private sectors when agents value money and fame. They
assumed not only monetary rewards matter in agents decisions but fame, which is defined
as peer recognition, matters as well. Recent empirical studies have also confirmed that the
innate curiosity of scientists make them research that can be publishable. Gulbrandsen
(2005), Goktepe (2008) investigated the motives of inventors to patent. They asked
whether monetary rewards or non-monetary rewards were important motivations for pat-
enting. Consistently these studies although limited in scope found that personal satisfaction
and doing something professionally enjoyable were important reasons for scientists to be
involved in commercialization. They found that social and personal rewards (i.e. the fact
that the innovation might increase the performance of the organization where the inventor
works), personal satisfaction to show that something is technically possible, and gaining
prestige and reputation) were considered by the inventors to be more important than other
types of compensation like monetary rewards and career advancement.
2.2 Patents as quality signals
Anton and Yao (2004) find that many of the patents do not actually reveal complete
information on the invention process, therefore leading to ‘little patents-big secrets’. So,
with this finding it seems plausible that monetary benefits to patents can be still assured,
without a danger to the knowledge underlying the invention process. But do all individuals
patent just because they want money by excluding others? While we know about the
monetary gains from patents, an equally intriguing gain is reputation. Since we are
interested in individuals, reputation seems to be another interest that would drive them to
act on different things.
Recognition is allotted to scientists to the extent they fulfilled their academic tasks
(Blume and Sinclair 1973). Reputation can be achieved and shown by scientific publica-
tions, honorific awards, positions at top-ranked institutes, and citations. Scientists
(researchers) have to publish in order not only to show the findings of their research but
also the quality, novelty and uniqueness of their findings. Publishing internationally peer-
reviewed scientific articles in top journals, being cited, participating in or even prestigious
being invited in top international conferences, teaching skills and receiving grants are
always considered as academic merits and improve the chances of academic promotion and
reputation. Due to the intensification of university-industry relations economic develop-
ment through technology transfer has become a ‘‘third academic mission’’ on a par with
universities’ traditional missions of teaching and research. We therefore wonder in addition
to the abovementioned tools, if scientists’ expectation of gaining reputation (visibility/
recognition) is correlated with their patenting and disclosure behaviors.
Competition for reputation among scientists, universities, public research organizations
creates both rising demand for and supply of researchers (Ben-David and Sullivan 1975).
Higher education departments of German states and university presidents in the US were
particularly inclined to accept scientific reputation as criterion for appointing professors
and evaluating institutions. Reputable scientists and lobbies (e.g. Gessellschaft deutscher
Natur und A¨rzte)6 persuade governments to establish new chairs and recognize new fields.
Reputation is believed to be a relatively objective, almost measurable yardstick (Ben-
David 1972 in Ben-David and Sullivan 1975).
6 http://www.gdnae.de/be89d0ed8a4810173299eb1891120558/de/start/ueber_die_gdnae/index.html.
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Quantity and quality of scientific publications, citations, conference presentations etc.
have been and are still guarantees of recognition from the scientific community and
employers. Although patents are not peer reviewed, the patenting process is exhaustive and
extensive concerning the novelty, usefulness, non-obviousness and technical utility. In
particular, for the fulfillment of Third Mission activities, scientists are expected to interact
with the surrounding society and be more active in commercial activities in addition to
their usual tasks. Patenting activities have thus become considered as tools for rewards to
gain reputation/recognition, and financial benefits. In order to be reputable, in the first
place, information has to be conveyed about the person in context. In this view, a scientist
can be thought of conveying ‘his type’ (highly productive–low productive) to specifically
two or more groups of people. One major group would be the compatriots in the research
field concerned while another can be the employer. To the first group, scientists have three
ways to convey information about their type—either publish, or patent, or do both. To the
second group in addition to these two ways, one specific channel would be to report their
findings officially—meaning—disclose their invention to the employer on an official
basis.7
While the rewards for academic researchers are still largely based on publications, they
also receive some (limited) commercial returns to patenting and other forms of commercial
science (Edwards et al. 2006). Even when financially unsuccessful, commercial science
provides additional scientific resources. For example, Murray and Graham (2007) show
that participation in commercial science brings with it distinctive forms of status and
resources and that patents have become an integral part of faculty strategies for the dis-
semination of ideas and for signaling interest in commercial activities. Patents can be used
as a tool to trade with industry for access to funding, equipment, materials and other
opportunities from industry (Stephan and Levin 1992; Owen-Smith and Powell 2001).
Scientists can use patents as a signal to show the industrial relevance and applicability of
their research results in order to attract more industrial support. In this case, the research
results would be likely to be patented together with the industrial financier of the project.
Based on the arguments posed until now, we frame the following hypotheses for
empirical analysis. Since we do not make a case for only reputation or only money drives
patenting, we test several possibilities in terms of methodology. To empirically test these
specific hypotheses, we also account for several individual and external (institution spe-
cific) factors that may influence patenting and invention disclosure decision of scientists.
– H1: Expected reputation affects scientists’ patenting and invention disclosure
activities.
– H2: Expected monetary benefits affect scientists’ patenting and invention disclosure
activities.
3 Research context
In this section we first give brief information about public research organization, i.e. Max
Planck Society, as the background for our research context. We then present the rules and
regulations concerning industrial co-operation and patenting activities of scientists who are
7 Invention disclosure to the employer is a job requirement. Different from the former university patent
legislation (university teachers’ privilege (Sect. 42 ArbNErfG—Law on Employees’ Inventions), [organi-
zational] ownership of intellectual property rights (IPR) regime has been valid since the 1970s.
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affiliated with different institutes at Max Planck Society (MPG hereafter).8 MPG was
founded in the late 1940s in Germany. The Max Planck Institutes are engaged in numerous
disciplines which are highly regarded as national and international centers of excellence,
and their scientists publish more than 12,000 scientific articles, books, conference reports
and other publications each year. The research results (discoveries, inventions, patents) of
MPG scientists have also industrial applications. For example, the so-called FLASH-
technology in magnetic resonance imaging and the novel cancer treatment Sutent are both
based on the research work of scientists from the Max Planck Society.9
Rules concerning the ownership of intellectual property (IP) at MPG have been always
different from the former university patent legislation (a.k.a. university teachers’ privi-
lege—Law on Employees’ Inventions). Quite similar to the US Bayh–Dole Act, organi-
zational ownership of intellectual property rights (IPR) regime has been valid since the
1970s. In 2002, this regime has become a model of organizing IPR for university inven-
tions as well. Since 1971 MPG has also a well-established tradition of technology transfer
through a dedicated technology transfer office (Max Planck Innovation, MPG–TTO) to
promote technology transfer, and provide guidance e.g. patenting, licensing and venture
creation (Buenstorf 2006). Its primary aim is the transfer of patented and non-patented
technologies developed by Max Planck Institutes to industry and to negotiate and close
license agreements.10
The survey was conducted in the last part of 2007 at 67 institutes (out of 80 institutes)
specialized in different scientific disciplines and located different cities in Germany. The
MPG is funded to large extent by both the federal and state governments. Although the aim
is to conduct basic research in the interest of general public in natural sciences, life
sciences, social sciences and the humanities; the institutes takes up new and innovative
ideas that the German universities are not in a position to conduct adequately. By providing
equipments, facilities the research at the MPG complements the work done at the uni-
versities. Currently the MPG has 4,300 scientists and substantial amount of graduate
students, post-docs and guests scientists. 51% come from abroad. In 2006, the budget was
around 1,379.1 million euros. 82% is from federal and state governments, while 13% is
from projects supported by government, federal states and the EU. Donations, evaluation
royalties etc. amount to 5%. The MPG has not only a strong scientific base, but a well-
established tradition of technology transfer, as well as has been a seedbed for technological
developments.
3.1 Industrial co-operations
Industry often is interested to collaborate on a particular research area with a Max Planck
Institute or to further develop a licensed invention in collaboration with the Max Planck
Institute. The respective cooperation agreements usually provide for grants that allow the
institute to carry out the developmental work. However it should be ensured that the
subject of the collaboration is sufficiently narrowed down so that it does not comprise the
whole research area of the department involved; that the freedom of the institute to publish
is guaranteed (taking into account the interest of the collaboration partner); that inventions
made by scientists of the MPG within the scope of the collaboration are owned by the
MPG, and not by the industry partner (usually, the industrial partner is granted an option
8 http://www.max-planck-innovation.de/en/inventors_founders/inventors_faq/#08.
9 http://www.max-planck-innovation.de/en/industry/services_industry/.
10 Source: Max Planck Innovation Website. http://www.max-planck-innovation.de/en/.
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for a license with fair terms), and that license fees are not waived in exchange for con-
tributions in kind or research grants. Although MPG provides support for the closing of a
consultancy agreement, the formal responsibility lies with institute and the finance
department of the MPG. In contrast to license agreements, which are closed by Max Planck
Innovation (MPG–TTO), cooperation agreements are concluded between the industrial
partner and the institute itself. Since 1979 Max Planck Innovation (MPG–TTO have closed
more than 1,500 contracts with companies of all sizes and from all sectors, from start-ups
to global corporations. About half of the profits originate in the US, the other half in
Germany, Europe and Japan.
3.2 Invention disclosures and patenting11
According to Max Planck Society (MPG) employment contracts and also to the
Employees’ Inventions Act, all occupational findings or ideas that may have inventive
character must be reported to the institute’s management. Inventions made by MPG staff
members usually emerge within the scope of their research activities or are based on the
institute’s experience or work. These inventions are thus called ‘‘employee inventions’’. In
accordance with the German Employees’ Inventions Act, the employer, i.e. the Max
Planck Society, is entitled to such inventions—in so far as the Max Planck Society claims
them under the stipulations of the act. The claim will be examined and lodged within
4 months after the filing of the invention disclosure form. Once the Max Planck Innovation
(MPG–TTO), has filed a patent application, priority is ensured under patent law and there
is usually no obstacle to scientific publication.
Scientists of the MPG are obliged to publish the results of their research as soon as
possible, but they should try to protect their invention by filing for patent applications
prior to publication. Due to the fact that such publications such as conference posters,
abstracts, proceedings, handouts or masters and PhD theses etc., are damaging to novelty.
They endanger later IP protection in relation to the inventive step. Therefore, scientists
should contact Max Planck Innovation (MPG–TTO), prior to the publication of any
research results that seem—or whose further development seems—to be commercially
viable.
After receiving the invention disclosure form, MPG–TTO examine whether the
invention is likely to lead to a successful patent application and MPG–TTO evaluate the
commercial potential. To this end, they conduct patent searches and market research. If the
evaluation is positive—and after clearance with the inventor(s) and the Max Planck
Institute, who meet the costs of the application—MPG–TTO instruct an independent patent
attorney experienced in the relevant field to draw up the patent application. They aim to
burden the inventor(s) as little as possible with this process. In general, the rough draft of a
planned publication is a sufficient basis for a patent application. Subsequently, inventor(s)
will receive an outline of the application for review and will be asked to answer any
unresolved questions sometimes with a patent attorney.
11 As we expect complementarities between patenting and publishing activities, i.e. most patentable
research is also publishable we do not go into the details on the publication activities of the scientists. As the
MPG-survey was conducted anonymously, we don’t have the names—other type of personal information
about the identity of the scientists—which could have been used to identify their publication rate. But as the
previous literature confirmed most patentable research is also publishable and MPG scientists are expected
to publish we are expecting these scientists are also quite active in publishing.
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Furthermore, the inventor must, to the best of his ability, support the Max Planck
Society in its efforts to apply for and commercialize his invention. As a rule, scientists’
complementary know-how is necessary to enable a future licensee to realize the economic
potential of a product based on the invention. According to the current MPG regulations
inventors generally stand to receive up to 30% of the gross license income that MPG–TTO
receives from the commercialization of the IP or know-how the scientists created. This
compensation exceeds the minimum rates of indemnification for employee inventions
provided for by guidelines currently in force in private industry and in the public sector,
and is intended to motivate scientists to participate actively in technology transfer.
4 Data characteristics, variables of interest and methodology
This paper is based on a large-scale survey of over 2,500 scientists in Germany aimed
at obtaining information about the commercialization activities.12 The scientists pooled
for this research are from the independent German non-profit research organization—
the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science (MPG hereafter). The survey
was conducted by a professional consultancy company TNS-EMNID from October
2007 till December 2007. It was a telephone-based survey and names of the partici-
pants were kept confidential and are not to be revealed. Previous studies on technology
transfer, academic entrepreneurship and available interview guides and questionnaires
were consulted before constructing the survey. To check for possible interpretation
errors and mistakes, pilot surveys were conducted with randomly contacted scientists
from other public research organizations in Germany. The survey has four parts in
which, the first part is about invention, patenting and research cooperation activities.
Second part focuses on entrepreneurial activities. The third part is about the perceptions
of scientists on commercial activities in general. The final part deals with individual
and professional demographic information (age, gender, academic title and education,
citizenship).
We chose inventions disclosed to MPG-innovation (TTO) and patents applied for as our
measure of a scientist’s involvement in commercialization activity. Disclosure is a process
by which scientists inform the TTO that they have developed an invention that they believe
has the potential for commercial applications. It is then the responsibility of the TTO and
the institute where the researcher is employed to either pursue IP protection or decline the
disclosure. While employment contracts at MPG mandate disclosure to the TTO, in
practice the process may turn into a voluntary activity where scientists take the initiative to
inform the TTO of their inventions. Under these conditions, the micro-motives and social
factors identified earlier become salient influences on the scientist’s disclosure and pat-
enting activities.
4.1 Empirical strategy
In order to construct the variables we first concentrate on the variable of interest—pat-
enting and invention disclosure. We use three groups of scientists to measure the rela-
tionship between likelihood of scientists’ patenting activities and their expectations
concerning the outcomes of commercial activities. Scientists who have only applied for a
patent; scientists who have only disclosed inventions to the MPG and do not have a patent
12 Survey tool can be made available upon request.
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and scientists who have both disclosed inventions to the MPG and also have applied for a
patent.
We further investigate if there is any difference regarding reputation and financial
rewards between the scientists who patented and who had only disclosed their inven-
tions to their employees. Inventing and patenting are two separable phenomena. It is
accepted that not every invention can be patentable, even if scientists may have the
expectations to patent. Investigating and comparing what are the perceptions of sci-
entists who patented and who made invention disclosures to their employees would
shed some light on the current debate on the role and ownership of IP at universities
and (PROs).
As mentioned before, we concentrate on the expectations of scientists who do not have
any form collaboration with industry (joint projects, direct consultancy etc.). It is important
to make this distinction due to some reasons. The choice to collaborate with academia may
be an initiative driven by firm’s objectives. Blind et al. (2006) showed that German firms
collaborate with academia for several strategic reasons. Mainly firm’s expect the patents
generated from collaboration to leverage their own knowledge as well as their positions in
negotiations with partners, suppliers and the financial sector. Therefore, the scientific
outcomes from a collaborative effort may result in patents mainly due to the firm’s
interests, rather than of the scientists. Moreover concentrating on non-collaborating sci-
entists gives us a chance to isolate the sample to those who have never been involved
actively in commercial activities and would be an ideal sample to test our hypotheses: what
would drive those scientists to patent who were never before involved in commerciali-
zation activities?
Since our interest was also to control the demographic nature of the respondents, we
have used age, gender (female or not), foreign-born scientist variables. We further
utilize data on their industry experience, MPG experience, the position (whether a
director, a group leader, a post doctoral fellow), and which field of science do they
belong. In order to clearly track the patenting and invention disclosure behavior one
has to also account for the personal opinions of the scientists with respect to the nature
and mode of commercialization. Scientists were therefore asked if they want their
research to be open (free from exclusion) and if they think a technology transfer office
(TTO) is indeed needed to take their research to industry or commercialize it in any
other fashion. We utilize this information in order to account for the personal opinion
of scientists about commercialization in general that may affect their actual commer-
cialization behavior.
The group of studies that focuses on individuals is inspired partly by psychology and
behavioral sciences. These studies have focused on the socio-demographic characteristics
of inventors. Macdonald 1984, 1986, Sirilli 1987, Amesse et al. 1991, Klofsten and Jones-
Evans 2000, investigated the characteristics, background and socio-demographic features
of inventors. Stephan and Levin (2005) investigated whether personal characteristics, age
(life-cycle), citizenship status, gender and receipt of federal funding were related to pat-
enting behaviors. They found little evidence of age effects, yet they found that tenured
scientists are more likely to patent than non-tenured ones (Levin and Stephan 1991; Ste-
phan 1996). Women patent less than men, although the effect is smaller since the number
of women employed in science and engineering fields relative to men is low. The socio-
demographic findings of these different studies are fairly consistent (see also Azoulay et al.
2007). Inventors were most often men; the average age being between 45 and 48. They
were highly educated and had technical and commercial knowledge and had experience
above the average.
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In addition to the individual (socio-demographic) factors, we also account for the
perceptions of scientists on the nature of their research (and scientific field), on the use
of knowledge (whether research should be open) and commercialization is not found to
be proper. Thursby et al. (2001) argued that scientists who specialize in basic research
may not disclose because they are unwilling to spend time on the applied R&D
required to interest business in licensing invention. Thursby et al. (2001) also stated
scientists may not disclose because they believe that commercial activity is not
appropriate for an academic scientists. Having this kind of perception or believing in
the Mertonian norms of ‘disinterestedness’—scientists would perceive that their
research results should be freely accessible to any other scientists and businesses. Such
scientists are also expected to be less interested in patenting or other commercial
activities.
Additionally the role of organizational factors, like the need for technology transfer
office (TTO) to help scientists in their commercial activities may also influence the like-
lihood of their patenting activities. Owen-Smith and Powell (2001, 2003) found that sci-
entists’ incentives to be involved in technology transfer are magnified or minimized by the
perceived costs of interacting with industry, TTOs, or dealing with patenting, licensing and
company formation individually. Faculty decisions towards commercialization are shaped
by the institutional and organizational environments which are supportive or oppositional
for university-industry technology transfer. We therefore control for scientists’ perception
on the role of technology transfer offices.
The set up for the econometric model therefore is of a multinomial discrete choice
model; specifically we use the multinomial logit estimation method. Measuring per-
ceptions is a tricky issue. Since our main propositions are on reputation and money
there are many ways that we could measure it. The scientists were asked whether they
expect commercialization (patenting, starting up a new venture, industrial collaboration,
consulting services etc.) to increase their reputation basing on a 5 point scale. In the
same vein, the question on whether they expect commercialization to make money was
asked. Using these two measures we constructed variables—high money, high reputa-
tion if the respondents strongly agree with the prospects of getting money, or getting
reputation.
The underlying model can be formulated as follows:
Patenting/disclosure Activity = f (expected rewards; age, gender, citizenship, career
experience, research milieu)
5 Estimation results and analysis
This section puts forward some statistics indicating on the nature of data, the variables
considered and the estimation results from the multinomial logit model. In order to test if
the multinomial specification is suitable we conducted Wald tests for combining alterna-
tives in multinomial specification. After conducting Wald tests, we performed the Small–
Hsiao test for independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. Tables 1 and 2 (in
Appendix) report the test statistics. As can be observed, the Wald tests support the choice
of multinomial logit method, while for two categories in the non-cooperator sample the IIA
assumption is not satisfied. However, for the cooperators sample this problem does not
seem to occur. This dissimilarity is mainly attributed to the method deficiencies in Small–
Hsiao tests mentioned by Long and Freese (2006) who cite a Monte-Carlo study by Cheng
and Long (2007) concluding that Small–Hsiao tests are not sufficient to test for IIA
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assumption especially when sample sizes are small. Therefore, we depend on the Wald test
and also on the fact that our categories are mutually exclusively coded in order to for-
mulate a multinomial logit specification to test our hypotheses.
After the necessary data requirements for the paper (cooperators, non-cooperators etc.)
we had almost 1,100 usable responses. Out of this sample, 110 scientists reported only
patenting, 99 reported only disclosure and 187 reported both patenting and disclosure.
Tables 3 and 4 (in Appendix) provides the descriptive statistics on the variables we con-
sider. It can be clearly seen that most of the scientists take both paths of patenting and
invention disclosure, but only few of them do it for money. It’s also interesting to see that
scientists who consider their research to be freely available for everyone also patent and
disclose inventions to MPG. The mean ages for every mechanism is around 40 while less
than a quarter of scientists patenting, disclosing or doing both, is female. Almost half of the
foreign-born scientists patent and the number is almost the same for disclosure, but lesser
for both.
Directors show a very high patenting and disclosing behavior, if not for each of them
individually. There is almost an equal share of scientists patenting in the broad fields of
biology and medicine compared to chemistry, physics and other technical subjects. Post-
docs and group leaders seem to show very high patenting and disclosure behavior. This
may be because they need to show performance mainly after Ph.D. and therefore they
might be more active in inventing and patenting. Given this scenario, we tested a multi-
nomial logit model where all the three categories (only patent, only disclose, both patent
and disclose) are considered. We provide the estimation results for both cooperators and
non-cooperators sample. Table 5 provides the estimation results based on the non-coop-
erators sample and Table 6 (in Appendix) provides estimation results on the cooperators
sample.
5.1 Non-cooperators sample
Based on our estimation results in Table 5 (in Appendix), we can observe that the
scientists who expect high reputation from commercialization activities are more likely
to perform both patenting as well as invention disclosure. This confirms our first
hypothesis that scientists who expect high reputation are more likely to use both
mechanisms. It can be interpreted as the scientists who would expect to have high
reputation would signal it through patenting and disclosing their invention to reach the
relevant audience who receive the signal. Secondly, we can see the effect is so strong
that if scientists want reputation they do not necessarily take any one of the paths, but
are very highly likely to take both.
Is money driving the patenting and invention disclosure behavior then? The answer
seems to be no. As can be seen in Table 5 (in Appendix) monetary expectations do not
affect the patenting and invention disclosure activities of scientists. In the light of these
results, our hypothesis that expectation of monetary gains affects patenting activity stands
to be rejected. It is indeed reputation that drives these two and scientists may view
achieving reputation more important than money. Academic interests might be of more
value to the scientists than monetary interests and this might be driven by the inner
philosophy of science and interest in basic research in order to solve the puzzle, answer the
questions that are left unanswered and other motivations.
This leads to the result on the perception of scientists on research as being ‘open’.
Even though descriptive statistics show that there are a number of scientists who patent
and disclose while having the view of open research, the estimation findings confirm
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their opinion. Scientists who consider research to be open are less likely to take any of
the three paths to commercialization. Scientists who consider costs of commercializa-
tion to be high are less likely to disclose their inventions but are more likely to patent
and disclose. If a scientist considers costs as high, she would not be willing to
approach the MPG to disclose the invention in the first place whereas if the research
has high potential (may be through reputation), it might be possible that the scientist is
willing to both patent and disclose.
Another interesting result is on the position variable. As a sequential process—the group
leaders and directors are more likely to only disclose or take both paths. This might be
possible due to the experience that each of these persons have by understanding the rules,
regulations and institutional culture of the MPG (i.e. existence of organizational ownership
of patents and an active TTO since 1970s). If the scientists respond that TTOs are indeed
needed for commercialization then that positively affects the likelihood to only patent or
take up both the paths. It is as well as due to the fact that the personal responsibilities
towards disclosing inventions may grow over time. This is confirmed by the MPG expe-
rience variable, that scientists having higher number of years with the MPG are more likely
to disclose their inventions to the MPG.
On the demographic aspects it can observed that older scientists are more likely to
patent and rather than only disclose their inventions or do both. Female scientists are less
likely to choose both paths and gender does not have an affect on any one of these paths
exclusively. The subject-area effects of scientists are taken into account too.
5.2 Cooperators sample
Table 6 (in Appendix) presents the results on the non-cooperators sample. As can be
observed the non-cooperators are not affected by reputational expectations when pat-
enting or disclosing their inventions. In fact, a striking result shows up on the monetary
expectations variable. Scientists who expect monetary rewards to be high in commer-
cialization are less likely to disclose or patent and disclose. A simple explanation can
be found in the fact that they are cooperators with the firms. As mentioned before,
firstly, the choice to collaborate with academia may be an initiative driven by firm’s
objectives. Blind et al. (2006) showed that German firms collaborate with academia for
several strategic reasons. Mainly firm’s expect the patents generated from collaboration
to leverage their own positions in negotiations with partners, suppliers and the financial
sector. Therefore, the scientific outcomes from a collaborative effort take shape of
patents mainly because of the firm’s interests, rather than of the scientists. Scientists in
cooperation agreements would very well know this fact and therefore, if they are driven
by monetary interests, they might not choose the patenting path and look for other
paths such as start-up activities or new product development that can be commer-
cialized directly from the labs.
The results on open research seem to be also valid for cooperators, in that, the scientists
who prefer their research to be openly available to others are less likely to patent or
disclose. The need for TTOs affects the patenting activities positively. As with the
cooperators, the group leaders are more likely to patent and disclose while the directors are
more likely to only disclose and do both. Years of experience in Max Planck affects the
likelihood of disclosures and choosing both paths positively. Age has a positive effect on
patenting and female scientists are less likely to patent and disclose. Industry experience
effects disclosure likelihood positively.
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6 Discussion and concluding remarks
Understanding of scientists’ patenting activities is still a recent phenomenon. Although the
patenting activities of scientists (universities and public research organizations) have been
seen as sources for innovation and economic development, concerns have also been raised
that scientists are moving towards applied research and away from fundamental research in
order to patent with the expectations of financial benefits. Many therefore argued that
patenting may challenge the culture and norms of open science. However, despite the
ongoing debates on the detrimental influences of patenting on scientific production and
norms of science, why researchers patent has not until recently received the same amount
of attention. Only recently some studies started to examine the incentives and motivations
behind scientists’ invention disclosure and patenting behaviors. This paper aims to open
this discussion and interest further.
In this paper we investigate to what extent financial benefits or reputation and rec-
ognition expected to result due to commercial activities influence the inventing and
patenting activities of scientists. These assumptions have been debated concerning the
context of industrial knowledge creation, protection, research and development (Sch-
mookler 1966; Rosenberg 1974; Eisenberg 1989; Merges and Nelson 1990, 1994; Long
2002; Cohen 2005; Thursby and Thursby 2007). We discussed this tension (money or
fame) specifically within the context of academic knowledge creation and from the
perceptions of scientists and their decisions to make inventions disclosures and patenting.
Instead of making a case for or against one factor, we investigated both aspects. By
doing so, we move beyond the traditional argumentation of financial incentives matter
for inventing activities while norms of science loses its ground due to increasing com-
mercial activities. We found despite scientists’ involvement in inventing and patenting
activities, such activities are related to their traditional academic concerns i.e. gaining
reputation and visibility than financial expectations. This paper thus also contributed to
the debate on the role of IPR and commercial activities at the universities and public
research organizations.
We used a newly created survey data on 2,500 scientists from 67 different institutes of
the Max Planck Society in Germany conducted in 2007–2008. To observe the effects of
individual factors (expectations and commercial activities), our identification strategy
involved studying two different samples of non-cooperating and cooperating scientists
respectively, in relation to industry collaboration. This identification strategy gives a
straightforward test for assessing the effects of motivations by isolating the sample that
entirely concentrates on laboratory activities for academic purpose, and hence how they
drive patenting activities.
Empirically, we show that non-cooperating scientists who have more expectations to
gain scientific reputation and visibility will more likely to patent. On the other hand
scientists’ commercialization activities do not necessarily respond to monetary expec-
tations. Scientists’ inventing activities are rather related to their expectations of recog-
nition and reputation while financial benefits are less important. Specifically, the
scientists who expect high reputation from commercialization activities are more likely
to perform both patenting as well as invention disclosure. This confirms our first
hypothesis that scientists who expect high reputation are more likely to use both
mechanisms. It can be interpreted as the scientists who would expect to have high
reputation would signal it through patenting and disclosing their invention to reach the
relevant audience who receive the signal.
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The scientists involved in industrial cooperation however, seem to be not driven by
reputational expectations and their patenting and disclosure activities might be more or less
affected by the firm in context and its motives. The scientists may rather choose some other
path of earning monetary gains than choose patenting because they expect patenting to
benefit the firms.
Invention disclosure and patenting activities could to a certain extent be independent
from private economic incentives. It can be clearly seen that most of the scientists take
both paths of patenting and invention disclosure, but only few of them do it in the
expectation of gaining financial benefits. It’s also interesting to see that scientists who
consider their research to be freely available for everyone patent and disclose inventions
to a lesser extent. Both of these can be viewed as information transfer mechanisms, not
necessarily for monetary gains but for the non-monetary benefits—such as reputation—
and prestige that the academic researchers foresee to be accrued. These findings are also
important because it means that the despite patenting activities and traditional academic
values seemed intact. Even when there are less or no financial expectations, commercial
science provides additional scientific resources and participation in commercial science
brings some kind of status and resources and that patents have become an integral part of
faculty strategies for the dissemination of ideas and for signaling interest in commercial
activities (see Murray and Graham 2007). However this does not mean that the design of
intellectual property rights, other forms of incentives (e.g. accepting patenting activities
as an academic merit, qualification for promotion or providing research funds to pat-
enting scientists), in academic organizations would not have effects on economic growth
and productivity. Controlling for a variety of other determinants, including age, gender,
citizenship, scientific discipline, industrial and academic experience, scientists with high
reputation expectation from commercial activities will more likely to patent. We
acknowledge that, these factors (reputation and financial rewards) are not mutually
exclusive meaning that under certain conditions (in the long term) reputation and visi-
bility of scientists may bring financial rewards maybe in the forms of research funds, if
not personal gains.
Even though scientists do no longer have a monk-like existence searching for truths
about nature, scientist’s involvement in entrepreneurial activity is not a transition from
their academic roles to another. By doing so, we indicate that, for these individuals, the
decision to participate in commercial activity is akin to managing multiple identities
(Pratt and Foreman 2000 in George et al. 2005) in order to signal that they have
multiple skills and knowledge (both academic and industrial); and they are able to
better respond to a variety of situations. Scientists are establishing a unique set of
experiences and values that are closely linked to their roles and academic career. We
assume scientists can not or will not easily suspend these sets of values even if they
consider being involved in commercialization activity. Therefore albeit scientists are
encouraged to get involved in commercialization activities (e.g. Third Mission), the
financial prospects of commercial activities is balanced against the cost of giving up
norms and thus expected rewards associated with their identity as scientists. Moreover,
despite rules and regulations scientists often possess high levels of discretion when
contemplating their involvement with commercial activity. More generally, although a
wider range of commercialization of academic research has becoming a component of
scientists activities, expectations from such activities are bolted on to the traditional
streams of research and what scientists generally value as a reward. Given this sce-
nario, we suggest that these individuals are likely to embrace valued aspects of their
existing role identity even as they enter the realm of commercialization. Especially in
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the context of Max Planck Society and in Germany, as scientists remain as academic
and having an academic focus is typically more respected than scientists having a
commercial focus.
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Appendix
See Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Table 1 Specification tests:
Wald tests for combining alter-
natives in the multinomial
specification
Ho: All coefficients except
intercepts associated with a given
pair of alternatives are 0 (i.e.,
alternatives can be combined)





Alternatives tested v2 df P [ v2
Non-cooperators
1-2 7.214 15 0.951
1-3 44.048 15 0.000
1-0 24.443 15 0.058
2-3 61.473 15 0.000
2-0 28.901 15 0.017
3-0 16,167.954 15 0.000
Cooperators
1-2 61.611 15 0.000
1-3 95.007 15 0.000
1-0 38,438.235 15 0.000
2-3 24.894 15 0.051
2-0 40.584 15 0.000
3-0 109.824 15 0.000
Table 2 Specification tests: small Hsiao–Tests for independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA)
Omitted variable ln L(full) ln L(omit) v2 df P [ v2 Evidence
Non-cooperators
1 -182.943 -133.349 99.188 32 0.000 Against H0
2 -159.450 -138.222 42.457 32 0.102 For Ho
3 -174.547 -134.674 79.745 32 0.000 Against H0
Cooperators
1 -216.996 -199.398 35.197 32 0.319 For H0
2 -191.277 -174.655 33.244 32 0.406 For H0
3 -160.783 -142.865 35.836 32 0.293 For H0
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs. Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives
Categories 0, 1, 2 and 3 denote no-commercialization, only patenting, only invention-disclosure, patenting
plus disclosure respectively
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics on
scientist patenting and invention
disclosures
The opinion based questions
report numbers that respond to
‘‘highly agree and strongly
agree’’ in the 5 point scale. All
others are particular numbers that
pertain to the column category.












High financial benefits (3-4 on a 5
point scale)
28 24 37
High reputation (3-4 on a 5 point
scale)
52 45 85
Open research 66 69 106
Commercialization costs are high 78 69 153
TTOs are needed 94 75 148
Age (mean) 41 40 44
Female 27 28 22
Foreign-born 42 40 49
Post-Doc 38 22 32
Group leader 26 24 78
Director 5 8 26
MPG experience(mean years) 8.3 8.9 12.2
Industry experience(mean years) 1.1 1.2 0.7




Table 4 Partial Correlations of MNL categories of patenting and invention activity with variables in the
estimation
Variable Overall sample Non-cooperators Cooperators
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig.
Reputation 0.0735 0.001 0.076 0.004 0.0516 0.180
Monetary incentives -0.0946 0.000 -0.0211 0.428 -0.1773 0.000
Open research -0.1293 0.000 -0.0828 0.002 -0.1225 0.001
High costs of commercialization 0.0271 0.215 0.0255 0.340 0.0215 0.577
Need for TTOs 0.0333 0.127 0.0617 0.021 0.0158 0.682
Post-doc 0.0398 0.069 0.0308 0.248 0.0525 0.173
Group leader 0.2168 0.000 0.1914 0.000 0.1911 0.000
Director 0.2019 0.000 0.1886 0.000 0.1816 0.000
MPG experience 0.1098 0.000 0.0434 0.104 0.1301 0.001
Foreigner 0.01 0.648 0.0354 0.185 0.0051 0.895
Age (log) 0.0152 0.488 -0.0001 0.997 0.0175 0.650
Female -0.0626 0.004 -0.0306 0.251 -0.067 0.082
Industry experience 0.0596 0.006 0.0166 0.534 0.0856 0.026
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Table 5 Multinomial logit estimates of reputation and financial benefits on inventing and patenting
Activities of scientists: sample 1: non-cooperators
MNL categories Only patenting Only disclosure Patenting and disclosure
Explanatory variables
Reputation 0.0934 (0.19) 0.0254 (0.18) 0.499*** (0.19)
Monetary expectations -0.214 (0.18) -0.134 (0.21) -0.161 (0.21)
Open research -0.153 (0.18) -0.177 (0.21) -0.536*** (0.18)
High costs of commercialization -0.108 (0.18) -0.245 (0.22) 0.545 (0.39)
Need for TTOs 0.423* (0.23) 0.0376 (0.24) 0.576** (0.29)
Post doctoral fellow 0.446 (0.35) 0.296 (0.53) 0.277 (0.53)
Group leader 0.793 (0.64) 1.944*** (0.65) 2.232*** (0.62)
Director 1.402 (0.85) 3.104*** (0.89) 3.246*** (1.11)
Years in Max Planck -0.0478 (0.040) -0.0224 (0.040) 0.0503 (0.035)
Foreign-born scientists 0.516 (0.37) 0.502 (0.42) 0.312 (0.37)
Age (log) 2.428*** (0.90) -0.129 (1.37) -0.00615 (1.63)
Female 0.0461 (0.40) 0.0972 (0.43) -0.940* (0.50)
Years work in industry 0.102 (0.25) 0.365 (0.30) 0.183 (0.32)
Biology & Medicine 0.725 (0.82) 0.477 (0.91) 19.14*** (5.77)
Chemistry/Physics/Technical subjects 0.558 (0.83) 0.653 (0.86) 18.19*** (5.79)
Constant -13.70*** (3.07) -3.135 (4.89) -25.88 (0)
Observations 1,418 1,418 1,418
Pseudo R2 0.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1. Reputation and Monetary
incentive variables are mean centered. Odds-ratios reported
Table 6 Multinomial logit estimates of reputation and financial benefits on inventing and patenting
Activities of scientists: sample 2: cooperators
MNL categories Only patenting Only disclosure Patenting and disclosure
Explanatory variables
Reputation expectation 0.0614 (0.14) 0.101 (0.15) 0.196 (0.12)
Monetary expectation -0.244 (0.16) -0.349** (0.17) -0.535*** (0.12)
Open research -0.418*** (0.14) -0.169 (0.14) -0.333*** (0.11)
High costs of commercialization -0.166 (0.18) -0.260 (0.22) 0.178 (0.19)
Need for TTOs 0.316* (0.19) 0.288 (0.18) -0.0153 (0.13)
Post doctoral fellow 0.339 (0.38) 0.186 (0.40) 0.425 (0.32)
Group leader 0.188 (0.40) 0.207 (0.41) 1.440*** (0.31)
Director 0.361 (0.82) 1.224* (0.66) 2.252*** (0.56)
Years in Max Planck -0.00893 (0.028) 0.0470* (0.026) 0.0531*** (0.020)
Foreign-born scientists -0.123 (0.34) -0.00732 (0.34) 0.0901 (0.27)
Age (log) 3.045*** (0.96) 1.044 (1.07) 0.413 (0.74)
Female -0.0677 (0.38) 0.209 (0.36) -0.761** (0.35)
Years work in industry 0.235 (0.21) 0.594*** (0.19) 0.252 (0.17)
Biology & Medicine 18.35*** (3.35) 0.324 (0.85) 1.363* (0.75)
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